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Some psychological aspects of linguistic data
W. J. M . Levelt, N ijmegen
In this article some aspects of the relation between linguistics and psychology are 
considered. It will be shown that some present day linguistic practices are dubious 
from the psychological point of view (section 4), whereas at the same time the psy­
chological relevance of linguistic theory is central to the transformationalistic con­
ception of linguistics (section 2). But even if linguistics is given a more moderate 
place in the psychology of language (section 3), certain types of linguistic data, na­
mely different sorts of linguistic intuitions, deserve very careful attention in view 
of their psychological unreliability. Uncontrolable introspectionism should be avoi­
ded and some recommendations to this effect are made (section 5). It is especially 
stressed that the linguist should not rely on absolute judgment of grammaticality, 
but only on relative (rank order) judgm ents; that he should order his rules with 
respect to their grammatical importance; and that he should study intuitions which 
have a high degree of reliability, such as intuitions on cohesion.
The paper is introduced by a short historical note (section 1), which ou t­
lines the main conceptions of the relation between psychology and linguistics during 
the past century and a half.
1. An historical note
The views on the relations between psychology and linguistics are as diverse as-the 
opinions about the relation between human mind and human language. The nine­
teenth and twentieth century literature on this subject is so extensive, that any short 
review necessarily oversimplifies the intricate matters involved. This is especially true 
for the present introduction, which will confine itself to a summary indication of 
the three most outstanding conceptions that have been proposed during this period. 
They a re : (a) psychology should be based on linguistics, (b) psychology and lingu­
istics are essentially independent disciplines, (c) linguistics should be rooted in psy­
chology.
a) Psychology based on linguistics
It was notably STEINTHAL, who emphasized that the functioning of the mind is 
to a strong degree determined by the structure of language. The intimate relation 
between the laws of thought and the form of language makes the study of language 
the natural way to the study of the human mind. In his Grammatik, Logik and Psy­
chology (1855), STEINTHAL introduces psychology with a review of linguistics. 
(For an interesting discussion of STEINTHAL’s work as well as other historical sour­
ces of psycholinguistics, see BLUMENTHAL 1970.)
18 Linguistische Berichte 17, 1972
STElriTHAL’s views were strongly influenced by the German idealistic 
tradition, especially by HUMBOLDT. HUMBOLDT had described language as a cre­
ative activity of the mind. The finite means of language used by the mind for the 
expression of thoughts is called Sprachform by von HUMBOLDT, and he states 
(1836, p 301): ‘T he  laws of thought are strictly the same for all peoples, and the 
grammatical forms of language only differ within a specific range, because they de­
pend on these laws” (see note 1 for the original text). Though it is clear from this 
citation that HUMBOLDT does not really base psychology on linguistics, as STEIN- 
THAL does, HUMBOLDT explicitly remarks that the particular “choice” a language 
community makes within this specific, range — which he calls Innere Sprachform — 
is identical with the people’s Weltanschauung (see note 2). This basic identity of 
language and “view of the world” is not only characteristic o f  STEINTHAL’s work, 
but also of the views of many later linguists, such as SAPIR and WHORF. Especi­
ally the latter’s “ linguistic relativity hypothesis” (WHORF, 1956) is a distinct and 
recent example of rooting psychology in linguistics: man’s picture of the universe 
is determined by his linguistic background.
b) Psychology and linguistics independent
The statement that psychology and linguistics are independent disciplines is never 
motivated from an alleged unrelatedness of their objects. It is the actual approach 
within these disciplines which makes them independent in the view of many scho­
lars. A good example is SAUSSURE (1916), who remarks that linguistics should be 
a subdiscipline of semiology, a (then) not existing science, which in its turn should 
be part of social psychology. In spite of this theoretical link between psychology 
and linguistics, SAUSSURE in fact proposes an extreme separation of these sciences. 
The absence of “semiology” as envisaged by SAUSSURE obliges the linguist to de­
cide for himself in these matters.
BLOOMFIELD too in his later work (1933) pays only lip service to the 
intimate relations between psychology and linguistics. In actual practice, however, 
he ignored psychology completely. This virtual separation of the two disciplines was 
rather predominant in the American tradition untill the fifties.
c) Linguistics based on psychology
Herman PAUL (1886) and the other so-called Junggrammatiker tried to root lingu­
istics in psychology, by using psychological principles for the explanation of lingu­
istic (diachronic) laws. Wilhelm WUNDT, their Leipziger fellow townsman, essenti­
ally adopted this same attitude in his psychology of language, which was an integra­
tion of the main trends of his time. Central in WUNDT’s system (1900) is the idea­
listic notion of Apperzeption. Apperception is the conscious focussing of an image 
or part of an image in relation to a larger whole. A psycholinguistic example of this
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process is the generation of a sentence. A sentence is the result o f  a hierarchical arti­
culation of a Gesamtvorstellung (a “general impression”)- WUNDT draws diagrams 
of how parts and subparts of such an image become conscious; they look very much 
like deep structures in modern transformational grammar.
From the empiricistic Junggrammatiker-tradition WUNDT uses the no­
tation of association which is especially relevant for the explanation of morphologi­
cal and phonological phenomena, the so-called Aussere Sprachform (see note 3).
WUNDT’s psychology-based theory of language was hardly affected by 
the work of his young colleague Ferdinand de SAUSSURE, who introduced the di­
stinction of langue and actes de parole: Langue is a property o f  the language com­
munity, a system of norms and rules, to which an individual language user should 
adhere in order to make his actes de parole communicative. WUNDT did not sym­
pathize with the idea of putting language aside as something meta-psychological.
This is also true of BOHLER (1934), who did accept SAUSSURE’s di­
chotomy, but who tried to give it a psychological basis by construing langue as a 
psychological “ instrument” (organon).
Many linguists on the continent, and most of them strongly influenced 
by WUNDT, have at the beginning of this century tried to explain linguistic pheno­
mena by psychological “laws” . One outstanding example was the Dutchman Van
GINNEKEN (1906).
2. Competence and performance — the transformationalists 
point of view
After a long structuralist period during which a virtual separation of linguistics and 
psychology was predominant, a new shift took place during the sixties. CHOMSKY 
and his coworkers, as well as the psycholinguists influenced by transformational 
grammar, strongly stressed their viewpoint that “ linguistics is a chapter of human 
psychology” (CHOMSKY, 1968). The essence of the relation between linguistics 
and psychology is the “interfacing” of competence and performance. Competence 
is the creative language capacity of the language user. It is the -  mainly unconscious 
— knowledge of the language user which enables him to produce and understand an 
unlimited number of sentences. Performance is the actual use of this knowledge in 
speaking, hearing, writing and other language activities. CHOMSKY’S and the cur­
rently predominant notions among transformational linguists about the place of 
competence in a model of the language user, can best be summarized by some cita­
tions. ”To study actual linguistic performance, we must consider the interaction of 
a variety of factors, of which the underlying competence of the speaker-hearer is 
only one” (CHOMSKY, 1965, p. 4). Other factors are psychological variables such 
as attention, memory span, etc. The following scheme summarizes this point of 
view:
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where linguistic performance involves production and perception of sentences, the 
judgment of sentences with respect to their grammaticality or their status to para­
phrase o f  other sentences, etc. The linguist tries to study and explain the one factor 
“competence” by controlling irrelevant factors as much as possible. He will especi­
ally investigate “clear cases” , i. e. sentences which have an obvious status of gram­
maticality in the language. The linguist’s developing theory will in the long run also
yield structural descriptions for more complicated, less clear cases. Their grammati­
cality will be decided by the theory, so to speak, instead of by the more or less con­
fused informant. In short, the linguist studies linguistic performance under the as­
pect of linguistic competence.
The psychologist, on the other hand, studies linguistic performance un­
der the aspect of the interaction of competence and the other psychological factors. 
An example is the study of how people understand multiply embedded sentences. 
From the clear cases (singly embedded sentences) the structure of such sentences is 
known. The psycholinguistic problem is how limitations of human processing capa­
city, such as short term memory span, push down storage capacities etc., affect the 
understanding of such sentences.
In this view, therefore, the linguist provides a psychological sub-theory, 
a theory about a relatively autonomous psychological capacity. The psycholinguist’s 
task is to integrate this theory in a more inclusive theory of linguistic performance.
The status of “competence” , therefore, is comparable to the place of
t
the notion “intelligence” in psychology. It is a theoretical construct to denote a re­
latively autonomous factor, which underlies a large variety of human behaviours. 
Such constructs have to prove their usefulness. After seven decades of intelligence 
research, there is little doubt about the notion of intelligence in this respect. Simi­
larly, “linguistic competence” may prove to be equally efficacious. Just as the strong 
interrelations between different forms of “ intelligent behaviour” justify the con­
struct “ intelligence” , empirical facts about relations between various types of lingu­
istic performance should justify the notion of “ linguistic competence” . It is the lin­
guist’s task to find the necessary empirical evidence, “ to determine from the data of
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performance the underlying system of rules that has been mastered by the speaker- 
hearer and that he puts to use in actual performance” (CHOMSKY, 1965, p. 4). This 
system of rules is called a grammar, which denotes both the competence itself and 
the theory of the linguist: “We use the term “grammar” with a systematic ambiguity. 
On the one hand, the term refers to the explicit theory constructed by the linguist 
and proposed as a description of the speaker's competence. On the other hand, we 
use the term to refer to this competence itse lf’ (CHOMSKY and HALLE, 1968, p.3).
Summarizing the transformationalists conception: linguistics is a chap­
ter of psychology, it studies a set of psychological conditions underlying all linguistic 
performance, this set is called “linguistic competence” .
3. Competence and linguistic intuitions
If one accepts for the moment the idea of one linguistic competence, which under­
lies all linguistic performance, the interesting question arises whether it is this com­
petence which is actually studied in transformational linguistic practice to date. The 
answer is, I think, negative. It seems to me that transformational grammars are not 
theories of linguistic competence in this particular sense. That is, it seems necessary 
to reject the just mentioned “systematic ambiguity” of the term “grammar” . Which, 
in fact, are the “data of performance” studied by linguists in the transformational 
tradition?- They are certainly not the primary data of linguistic performance such 
as actual speech, verbal expression of complicated states of affairs in the informant’s 
environment, discussions between people, and suchlike (For an interesting categori­
zation of linguistic data, see BEVER, 1970a.) The predominantly analyzed linguistic 
data are of a very different, “ secondary” character. They are mainly judgments of 
grammaticality, of paraphrase relationships, of word and phrase relations, etc. These 
can be called meta-linguistic data , i. e. judgments about language. The standard term 
for such data is : “linguistic intuitions” . It follows that a grammar (based on such 
data) is a theory o f  linguistic intuitions. This in itself is not in contradiction with 
the transformationalistic conception. It could be the case that a theory of linguistic 
intuitions coincides with the theory of the hypothesized underlying linguistic com­
petence. However, this is doubtful in view of the very special psychological status 
of linguistic intuitions among the data of linguistic performance. It is not at all ob­
vious that intuitions will reveal the underlying competence. One argument pro is 
that the linguist or informant who considers the grammaticality of a sentence tries 
to imagine an actual situation of “ primary” performance in order to decide whether 
the sentence “could be said” , i. e. is grammatical. Intuitions would then be seconda­
ry reflexions of primary performance. There are two problems involved in this argu­
ment. There is, firstly, nothing known about the accuracy and completeness of such 
reflexions. It is not only possible, but also quite likely, that the informant will de­
cide on the ungrammatically of a type of sentence, which he nevertheless utters fre-
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quently. This may Simply be due to the fact that he happens not to imagine the ap­
propriate practical situation. But more seriously, it may be that he is applying diffe­
rent standards in the actual and imagined situation. Secondly, if the linguist or infor­
mant is indeed imagining the primary speech situation while making his judgments, 
it is most unlikely that he will imagine the situation without the “irrelevant” psycho­
logical factors. The decision whether a sentence “could be said” will again be depen­
dent on considerations of memory span, naturalness, etc. There is, in our opinion, a 
complete absence of arguments in the literature in favor of the thesis that linguistic 
intuitions reveal the underlying linguistic competence. For recent contra arguments 
we should refer the reader to BEVER (1970a, b) and WATT (1970). Under the cir-
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cumstances we are not disposed to generalize the psychological importance of trans­
formational grammars beyond their “ face value” , i. e. as theories of linguistic intui­
tions. In the following we will investigate some psychological problems involved in 
intuitive data of this sort (section 4), and propose a few solutions (section 5). Be­
fore going into those issues, however, we wish to make three additional remarks a- 
bout grammars, intuitions and competence.
Firstly, it need hardly be argued that a grammar could be something 
different than a theory of linguistic intuitions. Grammars based on more primary 
data of linguistic performance could be (and are being) developed. Instances are 
grammars of dead languages. These are mainly based on samples of written utter­
ances and only exceptionally on linguistic intuitions (These are the rare instances, 
where descriptions of linguistic intuitions exist in the available texts.) A more im­
portant instance is children’s grammars. As an informant the child is a failure. The 
young child is not able to make systematic judgments about his own language. All 
recent work on child grammars (see McNEILL, 1970) is based on data other than 
intuitions. The data are samples of actual utterances, imitations, or non-linguistic 
performance elicited by verbal instructions ( “comprehension tasks” ). So, our study 
of linguistic intuition is only prompted by actual linguistic practice in transforma­
tional work, not by any principled conception of linguistics as necessarily a theory 
of linguistic intuitions.
Secondly, within the limitations of this actual practice I fully agree that 
a grammar is a psychological theory. Intuition is traditionally a psychological topic, 
and intuitive judgments are traditional data in psychology. Intuitive judgment was 
as basic to e. g. the Wurzburg School for its study of thinking, as it is at present for 
theories of choice (preference judgments), subjective probability, perception (judg­
ments of stimulus similarity), etc.
Thirdly, though I would welcome any serious effort towards empirical 
justification of the theoretical construct of “ linguistic competence” in the sense of 
a system of rules, put to use in actual linguistic performance, it seems to me that 
the notion is not essential to linguistic theory. Even if it could not be maintained 
that one system of rules underlies all linguistic performance, a systematic theory of 
linguistic intuitions would still be possible, interesting, and necessary.
4. The unreliable character of linguistic intuitions
Though the empirical basis for the transformationalistic approach to syntax is clearly 
intuitive judgment, CHOMSKY underlines the delicate character of intuitive judg­
ment : “This is not to say ( . . . )  that his (the speaker’s — W. L.) statements about 
his intuitive knowledge o f the language are necessarily accurate” (1965, p. 8), “ in 
short, we must be careful not to overlook the fact that surface similarities may hide 
underlying distinctions of a fundamental nature, and that it may be necessary to 
guide and draw out the speaker’s intuition in perhaps fairly subtle ways before we 
can determine what is the actual character of his knowledge o f his language or of 
anything else” (1965, p. 24). In Syntactic Structures (1957) it is emphasized that 
only clear cases of grammaticality or ungrammatically should be used to test the 
adequacy of a grammar, and that we should be prepared to let the grammar itself 
decide on the many intermediate cases.
After a decade and a half of transformational grammar, however, the 
situation turns out to be quite different. Instead of an increasing number of cases 
where theory decides on sentences of intermediate grammaticality, we see on the 
contrary a clear increase in the use of examples of borderline grammaticality as tests 
for syntactic rules.
To show the seriousness of this development, we list fourteen sentences 
from a recent anthology in transformational linguistics (JACOBS and ROSENBAUM, 
1970). In the source, each of these sentences is either marked as grammatical or as 
ungrammatical. It would be an interesting experience for the reader to make his own 
markings in the list below, and to compare them with the original markings, which 
are given in note 4.
(i
(2
(3
(4
(5
(6
(7
(8
(9
Your making of reference to the book displeased the author. (FRASER)
No American, who was wise, remained in the country. (POSTAL)
They never insulted the men, who were democrats. (POSTAL)
They never agreed with us planners. (POSTAL)
The talking about the problem saved her. (FRASER)
The machine’s crushing of the rock was noisy. (FRASER)
The giving of the lecture by the man who arrived yesterday assisted us. (FRASER) 
Your making of a reference to the book displeased the author. (FRASER)
Her slicing up of the cake was clever. (FRASER)
(10) John’s cutting up of four cords of wood yesterday and his doing so again to ­
day was a welcome gesture. (FRASER)
(11) John’s tendency to sleep along with Mary’s tendency not to do so ruined the 
party. (FRASER)
(12) I didn’t believe it, although Sid asserted that Max left. (LAKOFF)
(13) I didn’t believe that John would leave untill tomorrow. (LAKOFF)
(14) His criticism of the book before he read it (nounphrase). (CHOMSKY)
We used these fourteen examples as a demonstration for a group of 
twenty-four trained linguists. We asked them to decide which sentences were mar-
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ked as “ungrammatical” in the original papers. The results of this questionnaire are 
given in note 5. It turned out that “ungrammatical” cases had less chance (in fact 
less than half) to be judged “ungrammatical” than “grammatical” cases. Though 
these results cannot be taken too seriously since none of these linguists was a native 
speaker of English (although all of them had had advanced training in English and 
many of them were Anglicists), they are sufficiently disturbing to caution against 
present day use of linguistic intuitions. It is not necessary to wait for a repetition 
of this experiment with native linguists in order to mention some important factors 
affecting judgments of grammaticality which are systematically ignored by linguists:
a) Context of discourse
For many of the examples (1) through (14) the grammaticality marking seems per­
fectly all right in the original papers. Without context, however, the same sentences 
appear to be problematic. The development of an argument in a linguistic paper in­
fluences the grammaticality judgment in a thus far uncontrolled manner.
b) Comparison with other examples
A sentence which looks grammatical in isolation may nevertheless look ungramma­
tical if compared with other sentences. Sentence ( 1) above, for example, which is 
predominantly judged grammatical if presented in isolation is strikingly ungramma­
tical if compared with sentence (8). Inversely, sentence (15) is of very doubtful gram­
maticality.
(15) Tom was not present, and many of the girls believed that the paper had been 
written by Ann and him himself.
Nevertheless Ross (see JACOBS and ROSENBAUM, 1970) marks it as 
grammatical by contrasting it to (16).
(16) Tom was not present, and many of the girls believed that the paper had been 
written by Ann and himself.
which, according to him, is ungrammatical.
Judgment in isolation is very different from judgment by contrast. Which 
of the two methods should be preferred? It should be noted that stable criteria are 
rather the exception than the rule in absolute psychological judgment. Apart from 
sensitivity to “pay-off’ (in the case o f  linguistic judgment interpretable as clearly 
expressed expectations on the side of the linguist, especially if he is his own infor­
mant) absolute judgments show a “central tendency” : if many grammatical exam­
ples are given, one slightly less grammatical case will be judged “ungrammatical” . If 
a linguist wants a borderline sentence to be grammatical, he should place it at the 
end of a list o f  very ungrammatical examples. In recent texts most cases are presen­
ted in a contrasting context. In section 4 we will support this practice, but indicate 
some theoretical consequences of switching from absolute to contrastive judgment.
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c) The use of very unnatural and "funny" examples
Very confusing is the use of extremely unnatural and forced funny cases, which is 
frequent practice nowadays. Some examples from the same source (JACOBS and 
ROSENBAUM, 1970):
(17) Tom steals more money than Bill does to feed his family. (HALE)
(18) The number of dollars that a dozen eggs cost in China is greater than the num­
ber of degress centigrade the temperature was in Chicago. (HALE)
(19) That Tom ’s told everyone that he’s staying proves that i t’s true that he’s thin­
king that it would be a good idea for him to show that he likes it here. (LANGEN- 
DOEN)
(20) I dreamed that I was a proton and fell in love with a shapely green-and-orange 
striped electron. (McCAWLEY)
(21) Tom thinks that I tried to get Mary to make you say that the paper had been 
written by Ann and him himself. (ROSS)
All these examples are cases of explicit introduction of confusing factors. 
This practice can only lead to an increase of the already existing unreliability of lin­
guistic judgment. (The reader should make his own judgments of sentences 17—21. 
The “solutions” are given in note 6).
d) The linguist as his own informant
It is common practice that the transformational linguist bases his arguments on his 
own intuitive judgments. It was already indicated that theoretical expectations will 
probably influence such judgments. But the linguist as his own informant is a special 
case of the more general practice of using trained subjects. There have been earlier 
situations in psychology where trained subjects were used for “systematic introspec­
tion” . This was the case in the Würzburg studies of thinking (ACH, BÜHLER). The 
practice of systematic introspection was severely attacked by WUNDT (1907, 1908). 
Van de GEER (1957), in reviewing these discussions, questions what the subjects 
were actually trained in. In WUNDT’s time, he says, “ training was assumed to be an 
unlearning of bad perceiving-habits, not the learning of a specific technique of per­
ceiving. Nowadays we are inclined to say that the subjects were trained in a specific 
technique, and we recognize that different training systems may lead to different re­
sults.” , and further: “one serious objection can be maintained : the special training 
of the subjects and the impossibility to see in how far the Würzburg results are a 
consequence of this training. This objection is the more cogent as other studies pro­
duced results which were at variance with those of the Würzburg school (Gottingen, 
Cornell).” The present day situation in linguistics is quite comparable to the Würz­
burg situation. What implicit or explicit criteria is the linguist trained to use? Is this 
training different in different linguistic schools? The same fallacies of introspectionism 
threaten present day linguistic practice as long as the use of intuitive judgment is not 
protected by the necessary methodological precautions.
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5. Some precautions
This final section will be devoted to three groups of measures which may prevent 
some of the above-mentioned pitfalls and extend the range of use of intuitive judg­
ment in linguistics. The first group of measures concerns the control of factors which 
are extraneous to the linguistic rules under test, the second group of measures regards 
the special case of grammatically judgments, whereas the last points suggest the use 
of other types of linguistic judgment, especially the judgment of cohesion.
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a) Controlling extraneous factors
The informant’s attentional capacities should be maximally available for those as­
pects of the sentence, which reflect the syntactic rule under test. With respect to 
other aspects the sentence should be minimally complex. Any unnecessary loading 
of short term memory (such as in example (19)), any distracting semantic loading 
(such as in example (20)) should be avoided. It is often possible to construct such 
“natural” examples by leading a native speaker into a situation where he will pro­
duce a sentence o f the type under study. One or two additional changes will yield 
the right case.
Though on first view linguistic training is pre-eminently aimed at direc­
ting attention to the relevant aspects of the sentence, it was argued in 4 (d) that lin­
guistic training can as well be viewed as a training not so much in avoidance of irre­
levant aspects, but in the use of special criteria which are specific for the particular 
linguistic school. The linguist therefore should not rely on his own intuitive judg­
ment alone, nor on the judgments of other linguists. It seems necessary to check the 
intuitions of at least a few native speakers, nonlinguists, with respect to all examples 
in the particular linguistic study. This has the additional advantage of eliminating the 
effect of the context of linguistic discourse (4 (a)). .
b) The determination of grammatically
Though it is still advisable to use “clear cases” where they can be found, it is questio- 
nable whether at the present stage of linguistic investigation interesting parts of the 
grammar can be studied by the use of “clear cases” alone. For cases of intermediate 
grammatically we want to argue that the linguist should confine himself to the use 
of judgments about the rank order o f  grammaticality. That is, he should give his in­
formant a pair of sentences and ask him which of the two is the more, and which the 
less grammatical. Absolute judgments should not be used in view of the unverifiable 
shifts in criterion discussed in 4 (b).
Such practice, of course, has consequences for linguistic theory. If a hy­
pothetical syntactic rule x  is tested by a ranking procedure, and if the actual rank 
order conforms to prediction, the generalization will be that sentences which respect
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rule x are more grammatical than sentences which do not. Theoretically this means 
that addition of x to the grammar improves the adequacy of the grammar in the sense 
that the grammar gives a better account of degrees of grammatically. This is of course 
less than the prediction of absolute grammaticality. But the difference is probably 
more apparent than real. In the first place, the linguist should in any case give an ade­
quate description of degree of grammaticality, but secondly a slight extension of 
the proposed ranking procedure will eliminate all real differences between “absolute” 
syntactic rules and rules of degree. Rules can indeed be ordered with respect to their 
contribution to the prediction of grammaticality. Suppose that jc and>> are potential 
rules in the grammar, It is then possible to construct a “minimal pair” of sentences 
(S (x +), S(jc - ) )  with respect to rule x, i. e. S(x+) respects rule jc  and S(x - )  differs 
from S(jc+) in that it violates x. Similarly a minimal pair (S (y +), S(y - ) )  can be con­
structed. The informant can be asked to judge whether the difference in grammatica­
lity of the first pair is greater or less than the difference in grammaticality of the se­
cond minimal pair. From such a judgment it can be concluded which rule makes the 
larger contribution to the degree of grammaticality. Thus, a ranking o f  rules can be 
obtained by a ranking o f  differences in grammaticality. The seeming theoretical dis­
advantage, namely that one cannot conclude whether x o i y  respectively is or is not 
part of the grammar is more apparent than real because the present day linguist faces 
the situation that his list of rules tends to be extended more or less indefinitely in 
order to cope with more and more subtle cases. The advantage of keeping track of 
the ranking of rules, or at least of gross rankings o f sets of rules, is that it gives an 
indication to the linguist of whether he is wasting his time on subtleties while major 
problems remain unsolved.
Additional advantages of such rank order information about syntactic 
rules concern applied linguistics. In language teaching the more important rules should 
receive primary attention, and a similar situation exists in the design of computatio­
nal processing systems for natural language.
It should finally be remarked that judgments of rank, even if they con­
cern a ranking of differences, are in general more easy for a subject to make than 
absolute judgments.
c) The determination of cohesion
Some linguistic intuitions are more reliable and easier to test than others. It is not 
obvious that grammaticality or paraphrase intuitions should get more attention than 
other linguistic intuitions. One type of intuition in particular, namely about word 
group cohesion, has received little attention so far. It is, however, a strong candidate 
for reliable judgments.
CHOMSKY (1965) uses cohesion intuitions for studying rules of the 
base which concern relations between verb and prepositional phrase : “ It is well 
known that in Verb- Prepositional Phrase constructions one can distinguish various
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degrees of “cohesion* between the Verb and the accompanying Prepositional Phrase” 
(p. 101). This is demonstrated by comparing the ambiguous “he decided on the boat” 
with “he decided on the boat on the train” In the latter sentence “the first Preposi­
tional Phrase ( . . . )  is in close construction to the Verb” .
Various recent experiments (LEVELT, 1967, 1969, 1970, MARTIN, 
1970) show that informants are reliable judges of syntactic word relatedness. Pre­
sented with a sentence such as “He has put the coat on” , they very consistently judge 
the cohesion o f  “p u t” and “on” to be stronger than the cohesion of “coat” and “on” 
At first sight, such elementary judgments may appear to be of little linguistic inte­
rest. It turns out, however, that by appropriate techniques of data analysis, explicit 
tests of linguistic rules or sets of rules can be made. For a detailed discussion of 
these procedures we must refer the reader to the original sources. Suffice it to re­
mark that the transformational linguist should seriously consider to add other, and 
probably more reliable, types of intuitive judgment to his stock of empirical evidence.
Notes
*) Die Gesetze des Denkens sind bei allen Völkern streng dieselben, und die grammatischen 
Sprachformen können, da sie von diesen Gesetzen abhängen, nur innerhalb eines gewissen 
Umfanges verschieden sein.
2) Recent studies (e. g. BLUMENTHAL, 1970) sometimes stress the existence of conceptual 
relations between innere Sprachform and deep structure, and between äussere Sprachform 
and surface structure. It is interesting to notice that at least Humboldt’s innere Sprachform 
is just that aspect of language in which peoples differ, whereas deep structure is considered 
the more universal aspect of language.
3) The notion of association also has relevance in Wundt’s syntax. It is not always the case that 
parts of a sentence are essential elements of an integrated whole (such as subject and predi­
cate). In focussing the parts of an image, the speaker may have accidental associations with 
other images. In this way clauses may enter a sentence which are not the result o f hierarchical 
differentiation. This is especially the case in poetic language. This psychologically attractive 
distinction has been lost in transformational grammar.
4) “ Ungrammatical” are (1), (2), (3), (5), (6), (9), (11), (12), (14).
^  From the 24 linguists the following numbers of judgments “ ungrammatical” were obtained: 
for sentence (1*): 9, for (2*): 0, (3*): 0, (4): 4, (5*): 7, (6*): 3, (7): 16, (8): 11, (9*): 5, 
(10): 0, (11*): 1, (12*): 8, (13): 12, (14*): 5. That is, the “ ungrammatical” sentences had 
an average of 4.2 judgments “ ungrammatical” , whereas “grammatical” sentences had an aver­
age of 8.6, i. e. twice as much.
6) Only (17) is marked “ungrammatical” .
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